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Abstract
Background. Understanding the patient safety literature has been compromised by the inconsistent use of language.
Objectives. To identify key concepts of relevance to the International Patient Safety Classiﬁcation (ICPS) proposed by the
World Alliance For Patient Safety of the World Health Organization (WHO), and agree on deﬁnitions and preferred terms.
Methods. Six principles were agreed upon—that the concepts and terms should: be applicable across the full spectrum of
healthcare; be consistent with concepts from other WHO Classiﬁcations; have meanings as close as possible to those in
colloquial use; convey the appropriate meanings with respect to patient safety; be brief and clear, without unnecessary or
redundant qualiﬁers; be ﬁt-for-purpose for the ICPS.
Results. Deﬁnitions and preferred terms were agreed for 48 concepts of relevance to the ICPS; these were described and the
relationships between them and the ICPS were outlined.
Conclusions. The consistent use of key concepts, deﬁnitions and preferred terms should pave the way for better understand-
ing, for comparisons between facilities and jurisdictions, and for trends to be tracked over time. Changes and improvements,
translation into other languages and alignment with other sets of patient safety deﬁnitions will be necessary. This work rep-
resents the start of an ongoing process of progressively improving a common international understanding of terms and con-
cepts relevant to patient safety.
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Introduction
Understanding patient safety has been compromised by
inconsistent use of language. Similar concepts have different
terms (e.g. near miss, close call) and terms are used to
embrace several concepts (‘medical error’ for errors, viola-
tions and system failures). In a survey, 17 deﬁnitions were
found for error and 14 for ‘adverse event’ [1]. Another
review found 24 deﬁnitions for error, with a range of
opinions as to what constitutes an error [2]. A need was thus
identiﬁed for a comprehensive classiﬁcation, populated
by concepts with agreed deﬁnitions [3, 4], each labelled by
‘preferred terms’.
The core to the classiﬁcation is the clear deﬁnition of a
concept (e.g. failure to carry out a planned action as intended
or application of an incorrect plan), which is then given a
preferred term (in this case error).
An opportunity to address this arose with the launch of
the World Health Organization (WHO) World Alliance for
Patient Safety [5]. The formation of a drafting group for an
International Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety (ICPS) is
described in a companion paper, with some guiding
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Delphi survey and an iterative reﬁnement process are
described, undertaken to develop a conceptual framework
populated by relevant concepts. In a parallel iterative process,
guided by expert opinion and the Delphi respondents’ sug-
gestions, deﬁnitions of relevant key concepts with preferred
terms were agreed. The present paper describes this process,
the key concepts and their resulting deﬁnitions and preferred
terms, and how they relate to each other and to the ICPS
conceptual framework. Further development of the classiﬁ-
cation will support the measurement of safety, for example,
through its application in data collection systems such as
incident- reporting systems.
Methods
Many sources of concepts and terms were drawn upon (dic-
tionaries, literature, Internet), including the report of a pre-
vious Delphi process (itself drawing upon 165 sources) [1],
together with examination of over 700 responses to the
Delphi process [7, 8]. Many reﬁnements to the deﬁnitions
were made through exchanges by email and at ﬁve
face-to-face meetings of the drafting group [9]. Six principles
were agreed, two of which overlap with the principles out-
lined for the development of the ICPS [6]. It was decided:
† that concepts and terms should be applicable across
the full spectrum of healthcare from primary to highly
specialized care and should be consistent with the exist-
ing processes and systems.
† that concepts should, whenever possible, be consistent
with concepts from other terminologies and classiﬁ-
cations in the WHO Family of International
Classiﬁcations [10];
† that deﬁnitions of the concepts and the preferred
terms should reﬂect colloquial use;
† that deﬁnitions of the concepts should convey the
appropriate meanings with respect to patient safety;
† that deﬁnitions should be brief and clear, without
unnecessary or redundant qualiﬁers, starting with basic
deﬁnitions and then ‘building’ upon them for each
subsequent deﬁnition; and
† that key concepts and preferred terms be ﬁt-for-
purpose for the ICPS.
Results
Forty-six key concepts were identiﬁed (including those
describing the 10 ICPS classes), and deﬁnitions and pre-
ferred terms were agreed upon at the drafting group
meetings.
Following this, experts were invited to a ‘challenge group’
meeting to review the concepts and preferred terms, and
suggest reﬁnements and/or clariﬁcation. Consequently, two
additional key concepts were identiﬁed, deﬁned and given
preferred terms—giving a total of 48 key concepts and pre-
ferred terms.
How key terms and concepts chosen relate to the ICPS
conceptual framework is shown in Fig. 1. Deﬁnitions,
labelled by preferred terms, are listed in Table 1 in the
sequence in which they are discussed below, with preferred
terms listed alphabetically in Table 2.
Concepts are progressively introduced to allow under-
standing to be ‘built’, starting with the concepts in the title
of the ICPS (classiﬁcation, patient, safety). The terms in
italics have been deemed ICPS-preferred terms. Where terms
have been highlighted, the agreed deﬁnitions for relevant
concepts follow.
A classiﬁcation is an arrangement of concepts (bearers or
embodiments of meaning) into classes (groups or sets of like
things, e.g. ‘contributing factors’, ‘incident types’ and ‘patient
outcomes’) and their subdivisions linked to express the seman-
tic relationships between them (the way in which they are
associated with each other on the basis of their meanings).
For example, ‘contributing factors’ precede and play a role in
the generation of any ‘incident type’. Similarly, detection
precedes ‘mitigating factors’ and is followed by ‘outcomes’;
the progression of an incident cannot be limited until it has
been detected and its nature determined, and outcomes
cannot be described until attempts at limitation have exerted
their inﬂuence (Fig. 1).
Each class has hierarchically arranged subdivisions popu-
lated by concepts (e.g. ‘fatigue/exhaustion’ under the class
‘contributing factors/hazards’). Concepts may be represented
by a number of terms that allow for regional dialects, differ-
ent languages, different clinical disciplines and/or provider
or patient preferences.
A patient is a person who is a recipient of healthcare, itself
deﬁned as services received by individuals or communities to
promote, maintain, monitor or restore health. Patients are
referred to rather than clients, tenants or consumers,
although it is recognized that many recipients such as a
healthy pregnant woman or a child undergoing immunization
may not be regarded, or regard themselves, as patients.
Healthcare includes self-care. Health is ‘a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or inﬁrmity’—the WHO deﬁnition [11].
Safety is the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm to an
acceptable minimum, and hazard a circumstance, agent or
action with the potential to cause harm. A circumstance is a
situation or factor that may inﬂuence an event, agent or
person(s), an event is something that happens to or involves a
patient, and an agent is a substance, object or system that acts
to produce change.
Patient safety is the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm
associated with healthcare to an acceptable minimum.
Healthcare-associated harm is harm arising from or associated
with plans or actions taken during the provision of health-
care, rather than an underlying disease or injury.
A patient safety incident is an event or circumstance that
could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a
patient. In the context of the ICPS, a patient safety incident
will be referred to as an incident. The use of the term
‘unnecessary’ in this deﬁnition recognizes that errors, viola-
tions, patient abuse and deliberately unsafe acts occur in
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19Figure 1 Conceptual framework for the ICPS. Solid lines enclose the 10 major classes of the ICPS and represent the
semantic relationships between them. The dotted lines link relevant preferred terms to classes. The numbers in parentheses
as given in Table 2 represent the sequence in which they appear in the text and in Table 1.
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20Table 1 List of preferred terms and deﬁnitions for key concepts
1 Classiﬁcation: an arrangement of concepts into classes and their subdivisions, linked so as to express the semantic
relationships between them.
2 Concept: a bearer or embodiment of meaning.
3 Class: a group or set of like things.
4 Semantic relationship: the way in which things (such as classes or concepts) are associated with each other on the basis
of their meaning.
5 Patient: a person who is a recipient of healthcare.
6 Healthcare: services received by individuals or communities to promote, maintain, monitor or restore health.
7 Health: a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or inﬁrmity.
8 Safety: the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm to an acceptable minimum.
9 Hazard: a circumstance, agent or action with the potential to cause harm.
10 Circumstance: a situation or factor that may inﬂuence an event, agent or person(s).
11 Event: something that happens to or involves a patient.
12 Agent: a substance, object or system which acts to produce change.
13 Patient Safety: the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to an acceptable minimum.
14 Healthcare-associated harm: harm arising from or associated with plans or actions taken during the provision of
healthcare, rather than an underlying disease or injury.
15 Patient safety incident:a nevent or circumstance which could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a
patient.
16 Error: failure to carry out a planned action as intended or application of an incorrect plan.
17 Violation: deliberate deviation from an operating procedure, standard or rule.
18 Risk: the probability that an incident will occur.
19 Reportable circumstance: a situation in which there was signiﬁcant potential for harm, but no incident occurred.
20 Near miss:a nincident which did not reach the patient.
21 No harm incident: an incident which reached a patient but no discernable harm resulted.
22 Harmful incident (adverse event): an incident that resulted in harm to a patient.
23 Harm: impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any deleterious effect arising there from. Harm
includes disease, injury, suffering, disability and death.
24 Disease: a physiological or psychological dysfunction.
25 Injury: damage to tissues caused by an agent or event.
26 Suffering: the experience of anything subjectively unpleasant.
27 Disability: any type of impairment of body structure or function, activity limitation and/or restriction of
participation in society, associated with past or present harm.
28 Contributing factor:acircumstance, action or inﬂuence which is thought to have played a part in the origin or
development of an incident or to increase the risk of an incident.
29 Incident type: a descriptive term for a category made up of incidents of a common nature, grouped because of
shared, agreed features.
30 Patient characteristics: selected attributes of a patient.
31 Attributes: qualities, properties or features of someone or something.
32 Incident characteristics: selected attributes of an incident.
33 Adverse reaction: unexpected harm resulting from a justiﬁed action where the correct process was followed for the
context in which the event occurred.
34 Side effect: a known effect, other than that primarily intended, related to the pharmacological properties of a
medication.
35 Preventable: accepted by the community as avoidable in the particular set of circumstances.
36 Detection: an action or circumstance that results in the discovery of an incident.
37 Mitigating factor: an action or circumstance that prevents or moderates the progression of an incident towards harming
a patient.
38 Patient outcome: the impact upon a patient which is wholly or partially attributable to an incident.
39 Degree of harm: the severity and duration of harm, and any treatment implications, that result from an incident.
40 Organizational outcome: the impact upon an organization which is wholly or partially attributable to an incident.
41 Ameliorating action: an action taken or circumstances altered to make better or compensate any harm after an incident.
(continued)
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21healthcare and are unnecessary incidents, whereas certain
forms of harm, such as an incision for a laparotomy, are
necessary. The former are incidents, whereas the latter is not.
Incidents arise from either unintended or intended acts.
Errors are, by deﬁnition, unintentional, whereas violations
are usually intentional, though rarely malicious, and may
become routine and automatic in certain contexts. An error is
a failure to carry out a planned action as intended or appli-
cation of an incorrect plan. Errors may manifest by doing
the wrong thing (commission) or by failing to do the right
thing (omission), at either the planning or execution phase
[12, 13]. Thus, if screening for bowel cancer involves regular
testing for occult blood, then a screening colonoscopy in the
absence of prior occult blood testing comprises an error of
Table 2 List of preferred terms for key concepts in alphabetical order
Accountable (44) Incident characteristics (32)
Actions taken to Reduce Risk (42) Incident type (29)
Adverse reaction (33) Injury (25)
Agent (12) Mitigating factor (37)
Ameliorating action (41) Near miss (20)
Attributes (31) No harm incident (21)
Circumstance (10) Organizational outcome (40)
Class (3) Patient (5)
Classiﬁcation (1) Patient characteristic (30)
Concept (2) Patient outcome (38)
Contributing factor (28) Patient safety (13)
Degree of harm (39) Patient safety incident (15)
Detection (36) Preventable (35)
Disability (27) Quality (45)
Disease (24) Resilience (43)
Error (17) Risk (18)
Event (11) Root cause analysis (48)
Harm (23) Safety (8)
Harmful incident (adverse event) (22) Semantic relationship (4)
Hazard (9) Side effect (34)
Reportable circumstance (19) Suffering (26)
Health (7) System failure (46)
Healthcare (6) System improvement (47)
Healthcare-associated harm (14) Violation (16)
The numbers in parentheses refer to the sequence in which these preferred terms appear in Table 1 and in the text.
Table 1 Continued
42 Actions taken to reduce risk: actions taken to reduce, manage or control any future harm, or probability of harm,
associated with an incident.
43 Resilience: The degree to which a system continuously prevents, detects, mitigates or ameliorates hazards or incidents.
44 Accountable: being held responsible
45 Quality: the degree to which health services for individuals and populations increase the likelihood of desired
health outcomes and are consistent with current professional knowledge.
46 System failure: a fault, breakdown or dysfunction within an organization’s operational methods, processes or
infrastructure.
47 System improvement: the result or outcome of the culture, processes, and structures that are directed towards the
prevention of system failure and the improvement of safety and quality.
48 Root cause analysis: a systematic iterative process whereby the factors that contribute to an incident are identiﬁed by
reconstructing the sequence of events and repeatedly asking why? Until the underlying root causes have been
elucidated.
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22commission (the application of an incorrect plan), whereas
failure to arrange testing for occult blood would constitute
an error of omission. Violation is a deliberate deviation from
an operating procedure, standard or rule. Both errors and
violations increase risk, even if an incident does not actually
occur [12, 13]. Risk is the probability that an incident will
occur.
A reportable circumstance is a situation in which there was sig-
niﬁcant potential for harm, but no incident occurred, for
example, a busy intensive care unit remaining grossly under-
staffed for an entire shift, or taking a deﬁbrillator to an
emergency and discovering it does not work, although it was
not needed. A near miss is an incident which did not reach
the patient, for example, a unit of blood being connected to
the wrong patient’s IV line, but the error detected before the
infusion started. A no harm incident is one in which an event
reached a patient but no discernable harm resulted, for
example, if the unit of blood was infused, but was not
incompatible. A harmful incident (adverse event) is an incident
that results in harm to a patient, for example, if the wrong
unit of blood was infused, and the patient died from a hae-
molytic reaction.
Harm implies impairment of structure or function of
the body and/or any deleterious effect arising there from,
including disease, injury, suffering, disability and death, and
may be physical, social or psychological. Disease is a physio-
logical or psychological dysfunction, injury is damage to
tissues caused by an agent or event and suffering is the experi-
ence of anything subjectively unpleasant. Suffering includes
pain, malaise, nausea, depression, agitation, alarm, fear and
grief. Disability implies any type of impairment of body
structure or function, activity limitation and/or restriction of
participation in society, associated with past or present harm.
A contributing factor is a circumstance, action or inﬂuence
(such as poor rostering or task allocation) that is thought to
have played a part in the origin or development, or to
increase the risk, of an incident. Contributing factors may be
external (not under the control of a facility or organisation),
organizational (e.g. unavailability of accepted protocols),
related to a staff factor (e.g. an individual cognitive or beha-
vioural defect, poor team work or inadequate communi-
cation) or patient-related (e.g. non-adherence). A contributing
factor may be a necessary precursor of an incident and may
or may not be sufﬁcient to cause the incident.
Incidents are classiﬁed into a number of different types.
An incident type is a category made up of incidents of a
common nature, grouped because of shared agreed features
(Table 3) and is a ‘parent’ natural category under which
many concepts may be grouped.
An incident can be assigned to several incident types.
Thus, for example, an incident in which an infusion pump
was set up wrongly and delivered a sedative overdose,
causing respiratory arrest, would be allocated both ‘medi-
cation’ and ‘equipment’ incident types.
Patient characteristics are selected attributes of a patient, such
as patient demographics or the reason for presentation to
healthcare. Attributes are qualities, properties or features of
someone or something. Incident characteristics are selected
attributes of an incident, e.g. care setting, treatment status,
specialties involved and date of an incident.
With reference to medication, an adverse reaction is unex-
pected harm arising from a justiﬁed treatment, for example,
unexpected neutropenia due to a drug not known to have
this effect. Recurrence of a previously encountered adverse
reaction may be preventable (e.g. avoiding re-exposure of a
patient with drug allergy). Side effect is a known effect, other
than that primarily intended, related to a medicine’s pharma-
cological properties, such as nausea after morphine has been
given to alleviate pain.
Preventable is being accepted by the community as avoid-
able in the particular set of circumstances. Detection is an
action or circumstance that results in the discovery of an inci-
dent, e.g. by noticing an error, by a monitor or alarm, by a
change in patient condition or by a risk assessment.
Detection mechanisms may be part of the system (such as
low pressure disconnect alarm in a breathing circuit),
may result from a checking process or from vigilance and
‘situation awareness’.
A mitigating factor is an action or circumstance that prevents
or moderates the progression of an incident towards
harming a patient. The mechanism by which damage may
occur is already in train, but has not yet led to either any or
the maximum possible harm.
The term ‘recovery’ has been used to describe the combi-
nation of detection and mitigation; it does not refer to clini-
cal recovery (recuperation) but to the process of recovering
from an incident that has started. Reconnecting a breathing
circuit after a disconnect alarm warning is an example of
recovery. By collecting information about how and why
‘saves’ are made, system design, training and education can
be informed.
Patient outcome is the impact upon a patient which is wholly
or partially attributable to an incident. Where harm has
occurred, the degree of harm is the severity and duration of any
harm, and any treatment implications, that result from an
incident. It would seem, from ﬁrst principles, desirable to
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23record the nature, severity and duration of harm separately.
However, there are problems in doing this with substantial
overlap existing between these parameters and previous
attempts to rank the degree of harm tend to conﬂate these
parameters into one scale [14–16].
Incidents also affect healthcare organizations.
Organizational outcome is the impact upon an organization that
is wholly or partially attributable to an incident, e.g. adverse
publicity or additional use of resources.
Ameliorating action is an action taken or circumstance
altered to make better or compensate any harm after an inci-
dent. Patient ameliorating factors are actions taken or circum-
stances altered to make good harm to a patient, such as
ﬁxing a fracture after a fall, whereas healthcare system ameli-
orating factors reduce loss or damage to an organization, e.g.
good public relations management after a publicized disaster
will ameliorate the effects on a facility’s reputation.
Actions taken to reduce risk are actions taken to reduce,
manage or control any future harm, or probability of harm,
associated with an incident. Such actions can affect incidents,
contributing factors, detection, mitigating factors or amelior-
ating actions, and can be pro-active or reactive. Pro-active
actions may be identiﬁed by techniques such as failure mode
and effects analysis [17] and probabilistic risk analysis [18],
whereas reactive actions are taken in response to insights
gained after incidents (e.g. root cause analysis).
Resilience refers to the degree to which a system continu-
ously prevents, detects, mitigates or ameliorates hazards or
incidents. Resilience allows an organization to ‘bounce back’
to its original ability to provide core functions as soon as
possible after incurring damage.
A number of terms are commonly used regarding organiz-
ational management. Accountable is being held responsible.
Quality is the degree to which health services for individuals
and populations increase the likelihood of desired health out-
comes and are consistent with current professional knowl-
edge. System failure refers to a fault, breakdown or
dysfunction within an organization’s operational methods,
processes or infrastructure. Factors contributing to system
failure can be latent (hidden or apt to elude notice) or appar-
ent, and can be related to the system, the organization, staff
or a patient. A latent factor might be a breathing circuit dis-
connect alarm with no power failure warning or battery
backup [19]. System improvement is the result or outcome of
the culture, processes and structures that are directed
towards the prevention of system failure and the improve-
ment of safety and quality. Processes to counter the latent
failure described would include modiﬁcation of the equip-
ment to alarm when the power supply is compromised, or
use of an additional device, such as a capnograph, to alarm
if carbon dioxide is not detected in expired air.
Finally, root cause analysis, a reactive form of risk assessment
to inform the development of actions taken to reduce risk, is
a systematic iterative process whereby the factors that con-
tribute to an incident are identiﬁed by reconstructing the
sequence of events and repeatedly asking ‘why?’ until the
underlying root causes (contributing factors or hazards) have
been elucidated.
Discussion
The consistent use of key concepts with agreed deﬁnitions
and preferred terms, in conjunction with a comprehensive
but adaptable classiﬁcation, will pave the way for researchers
to understand each others’ work, and facilitate the systematic
collection, aggregation and analysis of relevant information.
This will allow comparisons between facilities and jurisdic-
tions, and allow trends to be tracked over time.
Forty-eight concepts were identiﬁed, and deﬁnitions and
preferred terms agreed. The concepts deﬁned and terms
chosen so far represent a collection of basic building blocks
to enhance the study of patient safety. Deﬁnitional reﬁne-
ment will be necessary as our understanding widens and
further needs are identiﬁed. Translation into other languages
is ongoing. More concepts will need to be identiﬁed and
deﬁned, and decisions made with respect to which terms
should be preferred and which terms avoided. An on-going
process is planned by which patient safety experts from
different cultures and parts of the world will test the ICPS
for the appropriateness and relevance of the concepts to
ensure they are ﬁt-for-purpose in all the contexts in which
the classiﬁcation will be used. This will ensure that the con-
cepts deﬁned and terms chosen will facilitate the understand-
ing and transfer of information among the increasing
number of people with an interest in patient safety.
Some terms for concepts were excluded because their
meanings vary across jurisdictions (e.g. ‘negligence’); they
have discipline-speciﬁc meanings (e.g. ‘accident’—in aviation
meaning the loss of an aircraft hull) or are already being
used with special meanings in a WHO classiﬁcation (e.g.
‘complication’, ‘misadventure’ or ‘sequela’). The term
‘healthcare-associated’ was preferred to ‘iatrogenic’ and
‘nosocomial’; these terms are associated with physicians and
hospitals, respectively, and the classiﬁcation is intended to be
of relevance across all healthcare.
Other sets of deﬁnitions and terms of relevance to patient
safety have been developed. Our primary consideration was
to try to ensure that our deﬁnitions would be ‘ﬁt-for-
purpose’ in the speciﬁc context of the ICPS. Given the
plethora of terms, concepts and deﬁnitions, it was inevitable
that ours would differ from many others. For example, a
Canadian set of patient safety deﬁnitions exist, which [20] is
somewhat discursive but provides insightful, valuable reﬂec-
tions on 26 concepts, 8 of which terms are deﬁned in our
current paper. Comparing the Canadian deﬁnitions with the
ICPS deﬁnitions of the same terms underlines the complex-
ity of trying to unify language and understanding. For
example, in the Canadian dictionary, one deﬁnition of safety
is given that describes a concept similar to that agreed by the
ICPS, but the ‘recommendation’ is for another deﬁnition to
be used which describes the ‘processes’ for ‘enhancing’ safety
(‘...the reduction and mitigation of unsafe acts within the
healthcare system...’).
A European set of deﬁnitions [21] was also developed at
the same time as the ICPS. Although the World Alliance and
the Australian Council for Safety and Quality are cited as
W. Runciman et al.
24sources for this work, of the 6 deﬁnitions in their list of 24,
which are also in the ICPS set, only 1 (risk) describes a
similar concept. The concept of risk is the only one similar
in both the Canadian and European deﬁnitions to the
concept agreed by the World Alliance. Alignment of con-
cepts, terms and deﬁnitions in the ICPS with those in other
extant sets is highly desirable; they include deﬁnitions that
should be considered for adoption by the ICPS.
In summary, deﬁnitions for 48 concepts relevant to
patient safety, with their preferred terms, have been agreed.
Their relationships to each other and to the conceptual fra-
mework of the ICPS have been described. This represents
the start of a necessary on-going process of progressively
improving a common international understanding of terms
and concepts relevant to patient safety, as a pre-requisite for
properly prosecuting some of the action areas identiﬁed by
the WHO resolution on patient safety: the determination of
global norms, and standards and guidelines for the deﬁ-
nition, measurement and reporting of adverse events and
near misses in healthcare; the promotion and framing of
evidence-based policies; and international benchmarking.
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